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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND BUD GRANT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CASSIE F. JONES, Administratrix of the Estate of
Marvin LaMar Jones, also
known as Marvin L. Jones,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

12481

BRIEF 0'F APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff seeking a reconveyance from the estate of one Marvin LaMar Jones, now derPased, of certain land and water stock certificates pre,·ionsl ~· conveyed and transferred by Plaintiff to said
decedent, for an ae-0ounting of the sums received by the
decedent from the sale of a part of said land and stock,
and for a money judgment in the amount of the sums so
received. The Defendant amended her answer with leave
of Court, claiming a set-off for amounts expended by she
1

and her decedent on the mortgage, taxes, sewer and water
liens and assessments against the land and stock.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LffWER COURT
The trial court ordered a reconveyance to Plaintiff
of the land and water stock not previously sold by Marrin
LaMar Jones, which reconveyance was subject to the
mortgage lien agains said land. The Court further
awarded Plaintiff judgment for $3,000.00 an acre, with
interest, for the eight acres of the subject land sold by
Marvin LaMar Jones to the State of Utah and for the
amount, together with interest thereon, received by said
decedent from his sale of 25 shares of the water stock.
An off-set of $12, 708.00, with interest tlwreon, was
awarded Defendant for payments made in keeping current the liens and assignments against the land and
stock, resulting in a money judgment to Plaintiff in an
amount of $20,200.62. Defendant moved the Court to
amend the judgment, or in the alternative, for a new trial
on part of the issues. The motion for a new trial was
denied and the judgment was amended, in part, reducing
the money judgment awarded to Plaintiff to an amount
of $18,955.00, less the total amount of any payments
thereafter paid by Defendant upon the mortgage loan
then against the land.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a determination that the evidence
before the trial court was not sufficient to support the
trial court's finding that the Plaintiff was to receive a
net amount of $3,000.00 per acre from the proceeds of the
2

8ale to the State of Utah of the eight acres of the subject
land so sold, but rather, that the evidence showed that
from the amount to have been received, Plaintiff was to
make payments of the sum necessary to procure a partial
release of the mortgage against said land.
Defendant further seeks a reversal of the trial
eomt's denial of her motion for a new trial of the issue
of the Plaintiff's obligation to make the payment necessary to procure the partial release of mortgage.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and the Defendant's decedent, Marvin LaMar Jones, had been business and social acquaintances
over a number of years. (R. 99, 100, 102, 112) During
this time, Plaintiff was purchasing certain land and
water stock under a real estate contract, (R. 120) which
land is situated at approximately 3010 East 7000 South
Rtreet in Salt Lake County and is more particularly described by the plat and warranty deed admitted by the
trial court as exhibits 1-P and 4-P, respectively. (R. 95,
%. 98, 124) Over the years between approximately 1959
and 1964, a number of attempts were made by the Plaintiff working in cooperation with Marvin Jones and a real
rstate broker, Myrna Mae Nebeker, to sell or lease the
subject land, but all such attempts failed. (R. 110, 113)
Part of the land was comprised of gravel deposits (R.
l 25) and it was finally decided that these deposits should
hl' sold. (R. 113) The Plaintiff had incurred a number of
obligations against the property (R. 144, 120, 121) and
it had been indicated that lien releases would not be

given for the gravel deposits without full payment of the
obligations being first made. (R. 122) It was decided
that the Plaintiff should refinance the property in order
to liquidate existing encumbrances and acquire a new
mortgage under which partial mortgage releases could
be obtained as individual parcels of the land were sold.
(R. 123)
The Plaintiff and Marvin Jones, acting under the
assumption that the Plaintiff's financial situation was
such that he would be unable to obtain a loan in his own
name, orally agreed (R. 126) that Plaintiff would deed
the land to Jones who would apply for and carry a mortgage loan in his name, giving the subject land as security.
(R. 122) It was agreed that the plaintiff would make all
mortgage payments on the loan to be so obtained (R. 121,
122, 130) and after the loan had been repaid, would receive a reconveyance from Mervin Jones of any portion
of the land not sold. (R. 122)
On August 6, 1964, a warranty deed was executed
by Plaintiff conveying the subject land and water stock
to Marvin Jones. (Ex 4-P, R. 114) A loan was thereupon
obtained by Marvin Jones from State Savings and Loan
Association (R. 120) in exchange for a mortgage given
by Marvin Jones on the land which he had received from
the Plaintiff.
On or about October 26, 1966, Marvin Jones sold and
conveyed to the State of Utah approximately eight acres
of gravel deposits located on the subject property (R. 72,
150) for which he received an amount of $46,625.00 (R.
72) and from which an amount of $20,000.00 was paid to
4

State Savings and Loan Association to procure a release
of the mortgage against the particular acreage sold.
(R. 105, 183) Marvin Jones retained the balance of the
sales proceeds. (R. 103) The Plaintiff did not at any
time pay any amounts on the mortgage loan, (R. 122,
131) all such payments having been made by Marvin
Jones during his lifetime, and thereafter, by the Defendant. (R. 131, 162)
Marvin Jones died on November 8, 1966, shortly
after the subject sale to the State of Utah had been completed. (R. 101) The Defendant, qualifying as surviving
spouse of the decedent, was appointed Administratrix of
his estate on March 7, 1967. (R. 101, 102, 107)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A
NET AMOUNT OF $24,000.00 FROM THE PROCEEDS ON THE SALE OF THE GRAVEL LAND TO
THE STATE OF UTAH, BECAUSE:
A. THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

'l'he design and purpose of the subject action is twofold. First, to establish in the Plaintiff an interest in
property, legal title to which is vested in Defendant.
tlecond, to obtain reimbursement of the proceeds derived
hy Defendant's decedent from the sale of part of that
propert_\'. In other words, to establish that the property
\\'as lwld and administered by Defendant and her de-
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cedent for the benefit of the Plaintiff - that the Defendant and her decedent were "constn1ctive trustees"
for Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff's action is grounded in equity. He held
at best only an equitable title in the property subject of
his complaint and as provided at 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity,
Sec. 63, " ... an equitable title is not the basis of a remedy in a court of law". The constructive trust, which in
essence is the remedy sought to be imposed, is an equitable remedy. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212; 209 P. 2d
229; 54 Am. J ur., '11 rusts, Sec. 218. Furthermore, the
Plaintiff's demand for an award of legal title in the land
is one in equity. This Court said in Richins v. Struhs, 17
Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314:

"It should be noted that this attempt to assert and
establish an interest in land, the legal title to
which is vested in another, is a proceeding in equity." (Emphasis added) 17 Utah 2d 358

This Court has historically recognized its authority
and responsibility as imposed by Article YIII, Section 9,
of the Utah Constitution, to review the evidence beforf'
the trial court in equity cases for the purpose of determining whether it preponderates in favor of the trial
court judgment. In reviewing the evidence before the
equity court in Nokes v. Continental Mining and Milling
Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954, the Court held:
"vVhere there is conflict in the evidence, the finding of the trial court will not be disturbe~ if. the
evidence preponderates in favor of the finding;
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nor, if the evidence thereon is evenly balanced or
it is doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor,
even if its weight is slightly against the finding of
the trial court, but it will be overturned and another finding made only if the evidence clearf;y
preponderates against his finding." (Emphasis
added) 6 -Ctah 2d 178 & 179.
The Court below found that the Plaintiff was to
have received a net amount of $3,000.00 an acre for the
eight acres af the subject land sold by Marvin Jones to
the State of Utah. The Defendant was accordingly orMn·d to pay to Plaintiff an amount of $24,000.00 from
the l>roceeds of that sale. The Defendant submits that
the preponderance of the evidence clearly indicates
that Plaintiff and Marvin Jones had agreed that the
$20,000.00 paid to State Savings and Loan Association,
to obtain a release of the mortgage on the acreage so
:;old, was to have been paid by Plaintiff from the
$24,000.00 proceeds which he was to have received from
the sale. The only evidence given at trial with respect to
this issne was the testimony of Plaintiff's witness, Myrna
Nebeker. She testified on direct examination:
"First of fall, we were working on selling eight
acres of the gravel land, and the agreement was
reached that Bud was to receive the first - I
believe, it was $3,000.00 per acre of land for the
land that would get sold. From that point, whatever the sale price would be, Marv would take the
expenses and would receive the difference between the amount to go to Bud and the amount of
the actual sales price, less expenses, whatever
that might turn out to be." (R.121, 122)

7
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equity in the exact amount of the payment made. There
is no effect or change in his net worth. In the instant
case, the Plaintiff had agreed to make all mortgage payments. (R. 121, 122, 130) Therefore, by making the principal payment necessary to procure the partial release
of mortgage, he would be increasing his equity in the
remaining land to the extent of the amount of the payment made. He would only be exchanging cash for equity
of a like amount. 'l'here would be no change in his net
worth by virtue of his having made the payment from
the $24,000.00 ($3,000.00 per acre - 8 acres) received as
his share of the proceeds of the sale.
Mrs. N ebeker's further testimony sheds light on the
question of who was to make the payment to procure the
pal'tial release of mortgage. Her testimony clearly indicated that the b·alance owing on the mortgage was not to
have been completely paid off at the time of the sale of
the gravel land. She testified:

"Q. Do you know, Mrs. Nebeker, whether or not
the remaining mortgage balance was to be paid
from the three thousand per acre amount that the
Plaintiff was to receive from the sale of the gravel
land 1 (Emphasis added)

A. No. It wasn't. I am having problems with
- . " (R. 133)
The testimony of this witness leaves no doubt as to
who was responsible to make the payments on the mortgage loan.
"Q. And was there any discussion at which M~.
Jones and Mr. Grant were present as to how this
loan was to be repaid f
9

Direct examination of Mrs. Nebeker continued:

"Q. _Correct me if I am wrong, Mrs. Nebeker, your
testimony was, your recollection was that Mr.
Grant was to receive the first $3,000.00 an acre
for any of that gravel land that was sold?
A. To the best of my recollection, that was the
agreement.
Q. And who was to pay all the expenses of the
sale?

A. Marv." (R. 126)
The subject testimony clearly indicates that the
Plaintiff was to realize $3,000.00 an acre for the acreage
sold by Marvin Jones and that Jones was to retain the
balance of the sales proceeds after paying the expenses
of the sale. The testimony is not, however, dispositive of
the question as to the nature of the expenses of sale contemplated by the parties.
A sales expense is by that definition an expense
incurred incident to a sale. In other words, an obligation
which would not have been incurred, but for the making
of the sale. Sales commissions, escrow fees, costs for
preparation and recording of documents of conveyance
are clearly expenses incident to the sale of real property.
But for the making of that sale, they would not be in·
curred. However, the issue here is whether a payment
of principle on a mortgage balance is such an expense.
Such a payment represents only an accelerated payment
of an obligation already owed - an obligation which
must be paid regardless of the sale. It is not an expense.
The mortgagor realizes an automatic increase in his
8

The Defendant respectfully submits that the clear
preponderance of the testimony before the trial court
indicates that the amount paid to procure a partial release of mortgage from State Savings and Loan Association was to have been paid from the $24,000.00 which
represented the Plaintiff's share of the sale proceeds. In
other words, that the $20,000.00 paid to State Savings
was to have been deducted from the $24,000.00 allocated
to the Plaintiff, who was properly only to have received
a net of $4,000.00 cash from the sale. The finding of
the trial court with regard to this issue is against the
clear preponderance of the evidence and the finding and
the judgment thereon should be modified awarding to
Plaintiff only an amount of $4,000.00 from the proceeds
of the sale of the gravel lands.
B. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE FIND-

ING IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL.

Even if it be determined that the Plaintiff's Complaint sounds in law rather than in equity, the evidence
before the trial court is insufficient to support its finding
that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive a net amount of
$24,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale to the State of
Utah.
This court, although consistently refusing to weigh
the evidence in cases at law, has nevertheless determined
that in such cases, a finding and judgment of the lower
court will not be permitted to stand unless it can be
shown that such are supported by substantial evidence.
San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co. v. Bd. of Education of Salt
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A. Yes. Bud (Plaintiff) was to repay the loan
(bracketed phrase added)
·
Q. This was the loan from State Savings~

A. Yes, sir." (R. 121)
"At the time the actual mortgage was taken out
Bud was to pay the payments .... " (R. 122)
Inquiry was made of Mrs. Nebeker specifically with
regard to the responsibility for the making of the payment to procure the partial release of mortgage.

"Q. Now, Mrs. Nebeker, what disposition was to
be made of the mortgage at State Savings from
the proceeds of this sale, who was responsible to
pay off the mortgage~ (Emphasis added)
A. Bud Grant was responsible to make the
monthly payments on the mortgage." (R. 130)
'' Q. Do you recall what was said by Marvin
Jones, and by the Plaintiff incident to this
matter?

A. Yes. That all proceeds from any sale would
have to go first to State Savings and Loan if
they gave the mortgage to pay off the mortgage
for a partial release to State Savings and Loan
before any other proceeds would be divided, .and
this partial release then would be out of the first
monies received, which would be going to Bud,
because this would be Bud's obligation, becaw;e
Biid was supposed to make the payments, the
remainder would have gone to Bud up to the point
where the profit area took place for Marv, a~d
the ... (expenses of) sale which was the comnu~
sion which should have gone to me." (Emphasis
and bracketed phrase added) (R. 150)
10

$20,000.00 was paid to State Savings and Loan Association (R. 105) leaving a balance of $26,625.00. Only an
amount of $2,625.00 would have remained after a payment of $24,000.00 to Plaintiff. From this amount of
$2,625.00, Marvin Jones would have remained obligated
to pay all expenses of sale, including a realtor's commission. (R. 150) A standard six percent real estate commission would have been in excess of the funds remaining
in his hands. It is difficult to comprehend that Marvin
Jones would have agreed to assist Plaintiff in this endeavor over a number of years, personally obligate himself on a mortgage, make payments thereon said mortgage and negotiate a sale of part of the land in question,
all for no significant consideration, and in addition, face
the possibility of having to dig into his own pocket to
pay a part of any sales commission incurred on the sale.
Defendant submits that there is no substantial evidence to support trial court's finding that the Plaintiff
was entitled to receive a net amount of $24,000.00 from
the proceeds of the sale to the State, and therefore, petitions this court to modify that finding, accordingly.

1
l

I

I
I
I

I

POINT II
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL ON PART OF THE ISSUES, CONSTITUTED
ERROR AND AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.

After judgment was obtained below, Defendant
moved the trial court to amend that judgment insofar as
it awarded a money judgment to Plaintiff. The Motion
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Lake City, 32 Utah 305, 90 P. 565; James v. Robertson
39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068; Dansak v. DeLuke, 12 Utah 2d'
302, 366 P.2d 67.

Heretofore set forth in this brief is the evidence before the trial court bearing upon the responsibility for the
making of the payment necessary to procure the partial
release of mortgage. It clearly establishes that the Plaintiff was responsible for the payment of the mortgage
loan against the property. The record is clearly devoid
of any evidence that would indicate mortgage payments
were to have been made by Marvin Jones or the Defendant. Admittedly, Marvin Jones was to pay the expenses
incurred in making the sale to the State of Utah. There
was no testimony before the court, however, indicating
that the parties contemplated that the $20,000.00 payment
made on the mortgage to obtain the partial release, was
an expense of sale to have been born by Marvin Jones.
To the contrary, the only testimony in which direct reference was made to the payment made to obtain the partial
release, was that given by Mrs. Nebeker, to which we
again refer.
" ... and this partial release then would be out of
the first monies received, which would be going
to Bud (Plaintiff), because this woidd be Bud's
obligation, because Bud was supposed to make the
payments, . . . . " (Bracketed phrase and Emphasis Added) (R. 150)
There is an absence of any evidence which would
sustain a finding that the Plaintiff was to take a net
$24,000.00 of the sale proceeds. Such could not reasonably have been the agreement of the parties. A total of
$4G,G25.00 "·as paid b~- the State (R. 72) from which
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order a m•w trial npon a motion groundPd in an immfficiency of evidence, the lower court determination will be
permitted to stand only if there is some substantial evidence in support of the finding under attack. Lehi Irriqation Co. v. Moy.le, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; Valiotis v.
Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Moser
c. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Inst., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d
136. In the Moser case the court said:
''The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down by
this court, is that where a motion for a new trial
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict, the trial court will not be held
to have abused its discretion in denying the motion unless there is no substantial evidence in the
record to sitpport the verdict." (Emphasis added)
114 Utah 66.
There is in fact no substantial evidence in the record
to support the trial court's finding that from the land
sale, the Plaintiff was to receive $24,000.00 over and
above the amount paid to procure the partial release of
the mortgage on the acreage so sold. As heretofore disenssed under Point I herein, the only evidence received
with reference to this issue was the testimony of Plaintiff's witness, Myrna Nebeker. She clearly testified that
any and all mortgage payments were to have been the
obligation of the Plaintiff. Her testimony as to the re~ponsibility of Marvin Jones to pay the expenses of sale
did not in any way indicate that the parties had contemplated that the sum to be paid in procuring the partial
release of mortgage was such an expense of sale. Clearly,
and again as heretofore indicated, such an obligation is
in no way characteristic of what is normally understood
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was grounded upon the premise that the evidence was not
sufficient to justify, among other things, a finding that
Plaintiff was <>ntitled to receive a net amount of
$24,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of part of the
subject land to the State of Utah. In the alternative, the
court was requested to grant Defendant a new trial on
the issue of the net amount which Plaintiff was to hare
received from that sale. The court entered its Order
amending the findings of fact and judgment in a number
of regards, but refused to amend judgment with regard
to the net amount to have been received by Plaintiff from
the sale to the State of Utah and, further, denied the
motion for new trial. Defendant submits that the failure
to grant a new trial on this issue constituted an abuse of
judicial discretion.
Defendant is cognizant of the wide judicial discretion
afforded the trial court in granting or denying a motion
for a new trial predicated upon insufficiency of the evidence, and that the trial court determination will not be
disturhPd absent a clear abuse of discretion. As held hy
this court in White t'. Union Pacific Railway Co., 8 Utah

56, 29 P.1030:
"The rule is, when a motion is made for a new
trial because of the insufficiency of the evidence
and the testimony is conflicting, the granting or
refusing (of) a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its acts >vill not be
overrnl,:>d unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." (Bracket word added) 8 Utah 57

In applying the doctrine enunciated in the White
Case, this court has further dete>rmined that as concerns
an appeal taken from tlw failure of the trial court to
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The trial court refused to consider the affidavit incident
to Defendant's motion.
Defendant submits that the refusal of the trial court
to grant her motion for a new trial relative to the amount
Plaintiff was to receive from the sale to the State of
Utah, together with the failure of the court to consider
the affidavit of Myrna Nebeker submitted in support of
said motion, constituted an abuse of judicial discretion,
there being no tmbstantial evidence in the record to support the finding subject of the motion.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment of
the trial court, insofar as it awards the Plaintiff a net
amount of $24,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of a
portion of the subject land to the State of Utah, should
be modified by this court, so as to reflect an award to
Plaintiff of only a net amount of $4,000.00 from the proceeds of said sale, and in the alternative, that this court
should grant Appellant a new trial on that issue.
Respectfully submitted,

BETTILYON & HOW ARD
Gary A. Weston

333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
& Appellant
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to represent a sales expense. On the only occasion that
she addressed herself directly to the question of who was
to make the subject payment, the said witness empha.
sized that all payments on the mortgage were Plaintiff's
responsibility. (R. 150) Nowhere in the record is it indicated that the Defendant's decedent was responsible for
the payment of the amount necessary to procure the
partial release of mortgage.
In support of her motion to amend judgment or for
a new trial, Defendant procured the affidavit of Plaintiff's witness, Myrna Nebeker, and filed the same with
the trial court. The only evidence going directly to the
issue with which we are herein concerned, was Mrs.
Nebeker's testimony as is reflected at R. 150 of the
record. The affidavit was intended to assi,st the court in
understanding that testimony should it have any question
as to wha!t the witness meant thereby. Therein the affidavit, the witness deposed:
'' . . . plaintiff and Marvin L. Jones did orally
agree that the plaintiff was to receive an amount
of $3,000.00 per acre from the proceeds of any
sale of the gravel acreage of the subjeet property,
from which amount, plaintiff was to pay the.
amoitnts necessary to procure the release of
mortgage on the acreage so sold; that all proceeds
over and above $3,000.00 per acre were to be
received by Marvin L. Jones as his portion of tl1e
sale proceeds from which he was to pay all 0th.er
expenses of sale, including a real estate comm1~
sion and any remaining amounts would be his
sole earnings from the transaction."
(Emphasis Added) (R. 77, 78)
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